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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2005-06 the Indian government introduced a new band of Community Health Workers known 
as Accredited Social Health Activists or ASHA workers to improve basic health outcomes 
through community engagement. The initial rollout of the program, between 2005 and 2009, was 
heavily focused on 18 “high focus Indian states”, lagging behind on public health indicators. 
Using multiple rounds of data from the District Level Household & Facility Survey (DLHS), I 
create cohorts of 12-23 month old infants, spanning a period of ten years, to establish that 
immunization trends of infants prior to the program were not increasing at a statistically different 
rate in high focus states relative to non-focus Indian states. I establish that the introduction of the 
program caused a sharp deviation away from trend in these states relative to their non-focus 
counterparts. I employ a difference-in-differences framework to identify the effect of the 
program and use detailed public health data to control for state and time varying factors that 
could pose potential threats to identification. The model estimates statistically significant 
increases in the range of 14%-22% in the coverage of specific vaccines and the provision of full 
immunization in high focus states and a reduction in the percentage of infants with no 
immunization of up to 16%. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The only village-level public health institution in India that has endured the test of time is the 
Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) system, popularized as the anganwadi system 
since 1975. Rather than functioning as community health mobilizers or outreach workers, the 
anganwadi workers mostly implement supplementary feeding programs for children under six at 
the ICDS center and also weigh and monitor the growth of the children who visit the center. 
India experimented with a band of more general Community Health Workers (CHWs) in 1978 
known as the Village Health Guides, but this program was discontinued in most states by 1985 
as the central government did not consider the program to be a good return on its investment. 
Lack of adequate support, mentoring and supervision were predominant among the factors 
underlying the failure of the earlier large scale CHW program in India (NHSRC, 2011). However, 
small scale CHW programs run by NGOs, like the SEARCH program in Gadchiroli, the 
Comprehensive Rural Health Project in Jamkhed, both in Maharashtra, and the Mitanin program 
in Chhattisgarh have achieved high regard. With this in view, the Government of India has aimed 
to implement the ASHA worker program with ‘intensive and constant mentoring and support’, 
drawn from frameworks of successful NGO led programs within the country. 
Several mid-term evaluations of the ASHA worker program like the 2011 evaluation conducted 
by the National Health Systems Resource Center (NHSRC), and studies by Bajpai and Dholakia 
(2011) and by Gopalan, Mohanty et al. (2012) provide qualitative findings on the recruitment, 
responsibilities, training, incentives and supervision of ASHA workers, in smaller catchment 
areas, using cross-sectional, mixed-method surveys and focus group discussions. While some 
quantitative numbers on health outcomes in areas served by ASHA workers have been presented, 
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no previous attempt has been made to rigorously quantify the effect of the program on a public 
health outcome. The main reasons for cited for this are the fact that no region presents itself as an 
obvious control for an area “treated” with an ASHA worker and that much of the challenge is in 
understanding the mechanisms that contribute to the failure or success of an ASHA worker by 
taking into account the experience of different regions. While this is largely true, a quantification 
of the impact of the program using multiple years of nationally representative data and 
econometric methods of control is of relevance in a policy scenario where consensus on the 
effectiveness of voluntary community health workers is lacking and where previous experiments 
of a similar nature have failed to achieve scale and sustainability. 
The main value of this paper is in the fact that it aims to answer a question largely of interest in 
the public health literature, employing techniques more popular in the program evaluation branch 
of econometrics. The program in itself is not amenable to evaluation using techniques more 
popular among public health practitioners, where statistical focus is concentrated on creating or 
matching treatment and control groups based on observable levels of different variables. I 
employ a difference-in-differences methodology that uses panel data techniques to identify a 
causal parameter of interest even when treatment and control groups differ in observable ways, if 
the assumptions underlying such models are satisfactorily justified.  
The ASHA worker program is a cornerstone strategy of the country’s National Rural Health 
Mission (NRHM) with an implementation time-line ranging from 2005 to 2012. The initial 
policy statement of the program mandated that an ASHA worker be introduced, in every village 
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with a population of 1000, in 18 high-focus
1
 Indian states, which have weak public health 
indicators and/or weak infrastructure and in tribal areas of non-focus states. Non-focus states 
were free to implement the program but the central government funded the direct implementation 
of the program only in high-focus states (NRHM, mission document, 2005-2012). As a result, 
when the third round of the District Level Household & Facility Survey (DLHS) was conducted 
in 2007-08, collecting village level information on the availability of an ASHA worker and 
health sub-center level information on the number of ASHA workers who received the first 
round of training, on an average, high focus states had introduced and trained ASHA workers by 
a much larger magnitude in comparison to their non-focus counterparts. In contrast, other 
provisions of the NRHM such as the provision of an untied grant of 10,000 rupees per annum to 
each health sub-center or the formation of a Village Health and Sanitation Committee (VHSC) in 
every village were either similarly or more intensively implemented in non-focus states. 
While the data collected by DLHS is detailed and it is possible to track whether an ASHA 
worker is present or not in an infant’s village, the only variation in ‘ASHA worker intensity’ that 
I make use of in my analysis is the average of high vis-à-vis non-focus states. This is because 
this variation in the number ASHA workers is decidedly a result of the articulation of the specific 
policy in question, as opposed to the endogenous variation within states that could lead some 
districts or some villages to adopt the ASHA worker program more intensively than others. In 
other words, program placement bias issues are far more untenable in the latter scenario as 
opposed to the former. 
                                                             
1 The18 high focus Indian states are Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttaranchal, 
Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Assam, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland, Mizoram, 
Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. There are a total of 35 states (including union territories) in India. 
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The NRHM policy prescribes that the ASHA worker be a literate
2
 woman resident of the village, 
preferably in the age group of 25 to 45 years who is to receive training for 23 days in five 
episodes at the sub-center. The ASHA worker is not a paid worker but a volunteer who receives 
small sums per task performed. 
I choose childhood immunization as the outcome measure to quantify the effect of the ASHA 
worker program, even though the ASHA worker is envisioned to perform a host of tasks. One 
reason for this is that immunization is an easily quantifiable outcome and has a time series of 
available data. Moreover, immunization coverage rates in all of India and in particular rural India 
are far from universal, despite a long standing commitment by the Indian government towards 
universal immunization, since the inception of its Universal Immunization Program (UIP) in 
1985. Moreover, inter and intra-regional disparities in progress towards full immunization are 
grave. The government, donor agencies and NGOs target full immunization rates of greater than 
80% coverage, but in 2008 this figure was less than 43% in the high focus Indian states.  
One of the main tasks assigned to the ASHA worker is to counsel women on the importance of 
immunization and to mobilize women, children and vulnerable populations for monthly health 
day activities like immunization camps. Her other tasks include registering pregnant mothers, 
accompanying pregnant mothers to the health facility for delivery, paying home visits for 
antenatal care (ANC) for expecting mothers and promoting general awareness about health, 
sanitation and nutrition.  
                                                             
2 With education at least up to class 8  
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The District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS) is collected by the Indian Institute of 
Population Studies (IIPS, Mumbai)
3
 and is designed to provide information on family planning, 
maternal and child health, reproductive health of married women as well as utilization of 
healthcare services. The survey includes information on individuals and households, a village 
level questionnaire as well as surveys of health facilities part of the Indian public health set up 
like Sub-Centers (SCs), Primary Health Centers (PHCs), District Health Centers (DHCs) and 
Community Health Centers (CHCs). Currently, three rounds of DLHS data are available- DLHS 
I that collected data in 1998-99, DLHS II (2002-04) and DLHS III (2007-08). All three surveys 
include detailed questions on immunization which are posed to mothers regarding their last and 
last but one born child, born within three years prior to the conduct of the interview. The village 
and sub-center level questionnaires include information on the availability of the ASHA worker 
and other publicly provided healthcare services. 
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. I break down section 1 into three sub-parts; the first 
part reviews the role of CHWs in healthcare provision, the second sub-part describes in brief the 
public health set-up in India to place the functioning of the ASHA worker within context, and the 
third section reviews other NRHM provisions that could have an effect on immunization. In 
section 2, I provide descriptive statistics and in section 3 I present the empirical model. Sections 
4 and 5 are devoted to results and robustness checks and are followed by a detailed discussion of 
the results in section 6. Section 7 concludes. All tables and figures are in the appendix. 
 
  
                                                             
3 IIPS also conducts the National Family Health Survey (NFHS). DLHS provides estimates that are representative at 
the district level in India. 
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1.1 Community Health Workers & Healthcare Provision 
 
The introduction of the ASHA worker program is a core strategy of the Indian government in its 
efforts to meet the 5
th
 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing the under-five 
mortality rate by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015. The revival of CHWs as agents of health-
care provision in India complements a global move towards employing CHWs on a national 
scale.  
In January 2013, the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network in 
collaboration with the Earth Institute at Columbia University launched a campaign to help 
expand and accelerate CHW programs in sub-Saharan African countries. The “one-million 
community health worker campaign” aims to equip and deploy one million community health 
workers, each serving a population of 650 rural inhabitants, by the end of 2015. The campaign 
has raised funds to scale up existing CHW programs in 10 countries to a national level, deploy 
quality-controlled protocols to these health workers, and help provide them with broadband and 
smartphone technology for real-time child and maternal health monitoring.  
While the idea of CHWs has been around for at least four-five decades, the renewal of interest in 
the strategy over the past five-six years has come with the belief that gains in maternal and child 
health can be made if we use the strategy more effectively and intensively than we have in the 
past. The new generation of CHW programs, including the ASHA worker program, emphasizes a 
framework of structured but rapid training of the health care volunteers, a well-defined linkage 
with the public-health set-up, a standard and well equipped medicinal kit as well as a strategy of 
leveraging modern communications technology to make the health workers more accessible and 
easy to monitor.  
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A well implemented CHW program is powerful because a majority of all health problems of 
rural populations can be prevented or managed by the people themselves, as long as they are 
identified and treated on time. The difficulty of bringing highly-qualified doctors and nurses to 
remote and rural locations makes the idea of “para-health workers” and “bare-foot” doctors all 
the more attractive.  
Patel and Nowalk (2010) highlight the potential of CHW programs in expanding immunization 
coverage through activities that increase both the supply and demand of immunization services. 
CHW can increase the supply of immunization services by identifying “hidden” populations 
living in remote hamlets and migrant populations. Such “targeted outreach” enables the delivery 
of vaccination services in areas where fixed immunization sites have not been able to deliver. 
Analogously, CHWs can increase the demand for immunization by eliciting “passive demand” 
which depends on parents providing consent for immunization, even though they may not 
actively demand it and also by gaining the trust of and educating communities who do not 
provide consent for immunization due to misconceptions about vaccine safety and conspiracy 
theories within communities. Such an example was seen in Ecuador where Amazon River 
community health workers were engaged to facilitate the identification of hard-to-find 
households and enhance the delivery of services. 
Ryman, Dietz et al. (2008) review evidence from public health and medical journals to document, 
among others, studies that quantify the effect of CHW interventions on the expansion of 
immunization in developing countries. The studies that satisfy their inclusion restriction include 
research designs that are either observational studies based on before-after comparisons or are 
cross-sectional comparative studies between groups that received a particular CHW intervention 
and groups that did not (though assignment was not random). For instance Tandon and Gandhi 
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(1992) present estimates of the effect of the ICDS (anganwadi program) on the expansion of 
immunization by comparing mean immunization outcomes of villages with an ICDS project in 
existence for 5 years with mean immunization outcomes of villages without an ICDS project and 
find immunization increases of 30-40% in areas with an ICDS project. However, they present no 
comparison of their treatment and control groups suggesting that these effects may be 
significantly biased upwards due to program placement effects. Overall, the authors conclude 
that given the scale at which CHW programs are looking to be implemented there is a grave 
dearth of scientific and rigorous research that evaluates their effectiveness.  
An issue that has received some interest in the program evaluation literature is the effect of 
financial and non-financial incentives on the performance of community health providers. 
Basinga, Gertler et al. (2011) find that when community health providers were given a “payment 
for performance” or P4P incentive of $4.59 per institutional delivery facilitated by the health 
provider, in comparison to a control group which had regular input-based funding, there was an 
increase in 23 percent in the number of births attended to by a professional. This payment 
amount is comparable to the amount received by an ASHA worker to facilitate an institutional 
delivery (Rs. 350 per delivery). Ongoing research by Ashraf, Bandiera et al. (2012) as well as the 
experience of an Indian NGO, the Comprehensive Rural Health Project in Jamkhed, suggest that 
non-financial incentives also show a lot of promise in motivating CHWs to deliver. For instance, 
the project in Jamkhed compensates health workers with business training and access to 
microcredit. Ashraf et. al experimented with a publicly visible thermometer that displayed a star 
for each female condom sold, and linked the stars to the social impact of preventing HIV. They 
found that this strategy sold twice as many condoms as the case where providers were offered 
financial incentives. 
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Both the provision of financial and non-financial incentives is costly when we consider a 
program of a scale like the ASHA worker program. The marginal effects of the ASHA worker 
program would need to be calibrated with the amount spent on each ASHA worker for a cost-
benefit analysis that has the potential to throw light on the long term sustainability of the 
program. This paper aims to do the former by placing careful bounds on the marginal effect of 
the program in high focus Indian states.  
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1.2 The Public Health Set-Up in India4 
 
Primary health care in rural India is mostly catered to by the public sector, with limited private 
provision. Indian health policy envisages a three tier structure comprised of Sub-Centers (SC) at 
the primary level, Primary Health Centers (PHC) at the secondary level, and Community Health 
Centers (CHC) at the tertiary level. SCs are single-room facilities manned by an Auxiliary Nurse 
Midwife (ANM), catering to a population of about 4,500 individuals or about four villages. They 
provide very basic health services like immunizing children, giving family planning advice, 
providing basic treatment for tuberculosis, leprosy, malaria as well as minor ailments. The ANM 
worker (sometimes along with another Male Multi-Purpose Worker) also provides advice related 
to village sanitation, water safety etc. The villages under the care of the ANM workers are 
usually spread out on an 8-10 km area.  
The next level of facility is the PHC which is usually located in a big village within the block. 
Each block has between 5-10 PHCs and each PHC acts as a referral unit for 5-6 SCs catering to a 
population of 25000-30000 people. It is manned by a medical officer/doctor, supported by 14 
paramedical and other staff and has 4-6 beds for patients but most of the treatment to patients is 
from the Out Patient Department (OPD). The highest level of facility is a CHC, which is manned 
by four medical specialists (surgeon, general medicine practitioner, gynecologist and 
pediatrician), supported by 21 paramedical and other staff and has an operation theater, labor 
room, x-ray and laboratory facilities. It serves as a referral center for four PHCs. In addition 
there are also district hospitals that act as an additional secondary tier for rural areas. 
                                                             
4 This section borrows from Datar A, Mukherji A, Sood N. (2007) and from module 1 of the ASHA worker training 
module. 
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The village institution highly relevant for the provision of immunization is the Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) or ‘anganwadi’ center. Each Anganwadi center caters to a 
population of around 1,000 and there is roughly one center for every village, run by an 
Anganwadi Worker (AWW). The center is a place where children under six gather every day for 
3-4 hours. The main mandate of the AWW is to weigh children, administer supplementary feeds 
for children and hold monthly health checkups done by the ANM worker to identify and treat 
sick children. Importantly, the Anganwadi center is the place where the monthly “health day” is 
organized, usually jointly by the AWW and the ANM worker. Child immunization takes place 
on “health days”5 and one of the main tasks of the ASHA worker is to help the AWW and the 
ANM worker in the organizing these camps. 
Other village health personnel include a Village Health Guide (VHG) and a Trained Birth 
Attendant (TBA), though many states have now discontinued their services. Other physical 
infrastructure may include private clinics, health centers run by NGOs, pharmacies/medical 
shops and visits from mobile health units (MHU). 
The main rationale behind the introduction of the ASHA worker as a village level CHW is that 
the existing set of public-health personnel are considered too outstretched to perform outreach 
and mobilization activities. The ANM worker caters to too large a catchment area to be in close 
enough contact with all families on a regular basis and the AWW performs a host of other 
activities and cannot serve the purposes of a more general CHW.  
  
                                                             
5 Vaccines are given free to all children on health days. They are also given at the sub- centers and the PHC.  
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1.3 The National Rural Health Mission 
 
The provisions of the National Rural Health Mission or NRHM are to be understood keeping in 
mind the above described framework of the Indian public health set-up. The different provisions 
of the NRHM are important to understand because the introduction of the ASHA worker is only 
one part of the entire mission, albeit an important one. I delineate, here the along with the 
introduction of the ASHA worker, some other features of the NRHM. While some of these 
provisions are highly relevant for the delivery of immunization services, in section 2 I show that 
these provision were not implemented more intensively in high focus Indian states vis-à-vis non-
focus states. 
The core strategies of the NRHM include: 
a) The introduction of an ASHA worker for every population of 1,000 in 18 high focus 
Indian states on a priority basis.  
b) Strengthening sub-centers (SCs) by giving each SC an untied fund of Rs.10,000 per 
annum to be used either for hiring additional Multi-Purpose (Male) Workers (MPWs) or 
ANMs, to sanction new SCs or to upgrade existing ones. 
c) Strengthen PHCs by ensuring adequate supply of essential drugs and increasing 
manpower. 
d) Strengthening CHCs, specifically focused on curative care, by increasing manpower 
(additional anesthetist posting) and creation of new CHCs to meet the population norm as 
per the 2001 Census. 
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e) Creation of “health plans” at the village level by a village health committee6 and a district 
health plan at the level of the district 
Other provisions include measures related to improving sanitation, strengthening disease control 
programs and mainstreaming “traditional healers” like those from the Ayurveda and Unani 
streams of medicine for curative care. However, the policy measures specifically relevant in their 
effect on immunization are the introduction of the ASHA worker and the strengthening of SCs 
and of PHCs.  
The overall work profile of the ASHA worker includes her acting as an interface between the 
community and the public health system, specifically by acting as a bridge between the ANM 
and the village, along with the AWW. The ASHA worker must be a literate
7
 woman resident of 
the village (married/widowed/divorced), preferably in the age group of 25 to 45 years. She is to 
receive training for 23 days in five episodes at the sub-center. The ASHA worker is not a paid 
worker but a volunteer who receives small sums per task performed. For instance, according to 
the guidelines issued by the central government, she is to be paid Rs. 150 per immunization 
session organized. Similarly, she is to be paid per “village health day” or “household toilet 
promotion” day organized. The estimated maximum amount out-go per ASHA per annum is 
roughly Rs. 17, 200 or roughly 325 dollars. The total number of ASHA workers hired between 
2005 and 2008 was around 602,190 ASHAs across the country. 
The NRHM mandates that the ASHA worker be promoted all over the country but special 
emphasis be laid in the 18 high focus states. The way this is carried out is that the Government of 
India that is the central government provides direct funding for the key components of the 
                                                             
6 Comprised of Panchayat Representative/s, ANM/MPW, AWW, teacher, ASHA worker and community health 
volunteers.  
7 With education at least up to class 8  
14 
 
program like the cost of training, incentives and medical kits for the high focus states but other 
states are to fund the program, following the activities of the center in high focus states, through 
an integrated financial envelope. Since, the central government has been a lot more proactive in 
promoting the ASHA worker in high focus states, the percentage of villages with an ASHA 
worker vary markedly between the two groups of states. 
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2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this sub-section I describe the data I use and present descriptive statistics to provide 
background for the empirical estimations that follow.  
As mentioned previously, each round of the DLHS survey collects immunization information 
from mothers regarding their last two surviving children, born in the three years prior to the time 
at which the interview was conducted. Immunization statistics are typically calculated for infants 
in the age group 12-23 months, because both international and Government of India guidelines 
specify that children should be fully vaccinated by the time they complete the first year of their 
life (NFHS 3, 2005-06). In order to obtain a longer immunization trend from the three survey 
rounds, I create cohorts of 12-23 month olds, by interview year, within each survey round. 
For instance, approximately 99 percent of the interviews in the DLHS 1 survey were conducted 
in the two years, 1998 (47.38 percent) and 1999 (51.96 percent). Thus, I create two cohorts of 
12-23 month olds from the first survey round. Cohort one includes children who were 
interviewed in any month of 1998 and were born between February 1996 and December 1997. 
Cohort two includes children who were interviewed in any month of 1999 and were born 
between February 1997 and December 1998. Similarly, 95 percent of the interviews in the DLHS 
2 survey were conducted in 2002 (44.89 percent) and 2004 (50.32 percent). From this survey 
round I create two more cohorts of children born in February 2000-December 2001 and February 
2002-December 2003 respectively. The bulk of the DLHS 3 survey was conducted in 2008 (93 
percent of all interviews) and I use this survey round to create my final cohort of children born 
between February 2006 and December 2007. This fifth cohort of infants was born after the 
introduction of the ASHA worker and they form the group of infants who are exposed to the 
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program while infants from the other four cohorts form the group that is unexposed for the 
purpose of my analysis. These details of cohort definitions are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 2 presents the percentage of children immunized by cohort, detailing statistics per vaccine 
and for the cases of full immunization and no immunization in high and non-focus Indian states. 
From the figures it is evident that immunization rates are substantially higher for infants of all 
cohorts in non-focus states vis-à-vis high focus states. This is to be expected as high focus states 
are those Indian states that were found lagging behind on public health indicators and are states 
with poor delivery of health services on the whole. It is also evident that for high focus states 
there are huge gains in the percentage of infants immunized across the board for infants in the 
fifth cohort vis-à-vis the fourth cohort. These gains range from a 13 percent increase in coverage 
for DPT 3 vaccines to a nearly 20 percent increase for the case of measles vaccine. In contrast, 
gains in the non-focus states are modest and in some instances like in the case of the DPT3 
vaccine, the Polio (OPV3) vaccine and for the case of full immunization, there is a decline in the 
proportion of infants immunized as we move from cohort 4 to cohort 5.  
Table 3 shows the distribution of the percentage of villages with an ASHA worker, by state, for 
high and non-focus states as measured by the DLHS 3 survey in 2007-08. The ASHA worker 
program was introduced in 2005 though ASHA workers were continued to be hired in 
subsequent years. According to data from the website of the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MoHFW), Government of India, roughly 0.6 million ASHA workers were hired 
between 2005 and 2008, out of which roughly 70 percent of these ASHA workers were hired 
between 2005 and 2007. Matching data from the MoHFW website and the village population 
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data from the DLHS 3 survey, I estimate
8
 that during 2005-06 there was roughly one ASHA 
worker per population of approximately 13,700 people in high focus states and the corresponding 
figure for non-focus states was roughly one ASHA worker per population of 75,000 people. By 
2008, the intensity of ASHA workers increased to one ASHA worker for every 2,900 people in 
high focus states and one ASHA worker for every 16,000 people in non-focus states.  
Table 4 summarizes data on other provisions of the NRHM and how they compare for high and 
non-focus states. From the table it is evident that in terms of the different provisions, the only 
NRHM  policy that high focus states implemented much more intensively than non-focus states 
was the number of ASHA workers hired and trained in the sample villages. For all other NRHM 
policies both the receipt and utilization of funds was much more intensive in non-focus states. 
For instance, the percentage of villages with an ASHA worker is nearly twice as much in high 
focus states in comparison with non-focus states and the average number of ASHA workers who 
have completed the first round of training in high focus states is nearly thrice the number in non-
focus states. However, the percentage of sub-centers that have fully utilized untied funds is 
nearly 21 percent higher in non-focus states and the percentage of primary health centers and 
community health centers that have fully utilized untied funds are higher by 24 percent and 14 
percent respectively in non-focus states. The percentage of villages that formed a Village Health 
and Sanitation Committee in non-focus states is approximately 85 percent as compared to 64 
percent of villages in high focus states. These figures clarify that we are not unfounded in our 
assertion of the group of high focus states as those states that differ from non-focus states in their 
implementation of the ASHA worker program. While there may be other state level factors that 
                                                             
8 These estimations are very rough. I calculate the fraction of ASHA workers who were in place by 2005-06 using 
the year-wise distribution of ASHA workers hired from the MoHFW website. I then use this fraction to approximate 
the number of ASHA workers in place by 2005-06 in the DLHS 3 village sample. Using the population of the sample 
villages, I calculate intensities.  
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changed at a differential rate between the time-periods represented by cohorts 4 & 5, in terms of 
NRHM provisions it is unlikely that the group of high focus states, in the aggregate, represent 
some other public health policy that was implemented in 2005 that would affect immunization in 
high focus states more than in non-focus states.  
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3 Empirical Model 
 
The key identifying assumption in a difference-in-differences (DID) framework used to estimate 
a causal parameter of interest is that outcome trends would be the same in both groups, the 
treated and control, in the absence of treatment. Treatment induces a deviation from the common 
trend. In a DID estimation framework, treatment and control groups can differ in terms of factors 
that are unchanging and this difference is captured by the group fixed effect in the model. 
Such a strategy is often used as a second-best approach in the evaluation of programs that were 
not randomized to begin with. When the treatment is not randomized, a DID model is an 
improvement over comparisons that either only calculate the mean difference in outcomes 
between areas with and without the program or those that calculate the difference in the outcome 
before and after the program in the treated group. In the former, the treatment effect may be 
biased due to permanent differences in the two groups and in the latter there is no way to control 
for time-varying factors that may be changing commonly for all groups under consideration. 
However, unobservable determinants of immunization that may be changing differentially in 
treatment and control groups, in the period just before the intervention and the final period at 
which the outcome is measured are still a potential source of bias and such an argument is often 
used to refute the validity of DID estimates. In my analysis I present a careful investigation of 
immunization trends prior to the implementation of the ASHA worker program and sequentially 
control for state-time varying covariates. 
In figures 1.1-1.6 I explore immunization trends for infants between 12-23 months, spanning 
cohorts 1 to 5.  For the cases of BCG (fig. 1.1), measles (fig. 1.4), full immunization (fig. 1.5) 
and no immunization (fig. 1.6),  the idea of common immunization trends prior to the 
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intervention, for successive combinations of cohorts 1-4, are clearly evident.  For the cases of the 
DPT 3 and OPV 3 vaccines (figs. 1.2 and 1.3) there is a steep decline in the rate of immunization 
growth relative to trend in high-focus states especially when we inspect the segment of the trend 
line between cohorts 2 and 3. I return to this issue and to an empirical formalization of common 
trends, in the form of “placebo” DIDs, for pairs of cohorts not exposed to the treatment in the 
section on robustness following the main results. 
The following four equations form the basis for my estimations: 
    [( ̅       (   )|    )  ( ̅       ( )|    )]  [( ̅       (   )|   )  ( ̅       ( )|   )]   ( ) 
         (   )     (    )     (   )  (    )                                                        ( ) 
          (   )     (    )     (   )  (    )     (     )                 ( )  
          (   )     (    )     (   )  (    )                                  ( ) 
Equation (1) summarizes the intuitive idea behind a DID estimate. The DID estimate, for each 
vaccine, is obtained by first obtaining the difference in the mean immunization of cohort   
( ̅       ( )) and cohort     ( ̅       (   )) for the group of high focus states, then by obtaining 
the same difference for the group of non-focus states and finally calculating a difference of the 
two. 
Equation (2) is a regression-based model of equation (1) and forms the baseline case for all 
estimations. Equations (3) and (4) include additional covariates in two different specifications. In 
regression equations (2) to (4),   is the constant,   is the coefficient on the treatment dummy that 
takes the value “1” if the infant is in a high-focus state and   is the sum of the coefficients on the 
included cohort dummies. In the three models,   is the coefficient of interest or the DID 
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estimator.  In models (3) and (4)    denotes state-fixed effects. In (3) (     ) accounts for a 
state-time trend variable. Here    is a trend variable that takes on values 0 to 4 as we move from 
cohort 1 to cohort 5. In (4),     denote state-time varying covariates. Finally, in both models,     
is a matrix of individual level covariates and     is a random error term.  
I estimate the regression equation ( ) using all cohorts 1-5. Regression equation (4) is estimated 
using cohorts 4 & 5 only, that is the cohort of infants who were 12-23 months old in 2004 and 
those who were 12-23 months old in 2008. 
For equations (2) to (4) the dependent variable (   ) is binary and is coded as “1” if the infant 
under consideration has received a particular vaccine, the entire set of vaccines or no vaccine. 
Even though the dependent variable is binary, I use a linear specification for all my estimations. 
Angrist and Pischke (2008) argue that if there is reason to believe that the Conditional 
Expectation Function or the CEF (as in equation 1) is a causal parameter of interest then a binary 
dependent variable does not pose any special challenges. On the other hand calculation of the 
treatment effect using a limited dependent variable model like a probit or a logit model requires 
additional distributional assumptions in order to recover the size of the treatment effect. For ease 
of interpretation of the size of the treatment effect I use a linear probability model. 
In all models I cluster standard errors at the state-level. In settings where the treatment varies at a 
group-level, clustering standard errors ensures that the individual error terms are allowed to be 
correlated within group. Not clustering standard errors seriously overestimates precision in such 
settings and imposes the assumption that unobservable shocks to individuals within a group are 
independent of each other. 
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4 Results 
The first row of table 5 presents DID estimates from estimating regression equation ( ) as the 
baseline case. As mentioned previously, these estimates are obtained using the complete dataset 
with cohorts 1-5. Here the δ coefficient shows the increase in immunization in high focus states, 
of infants in cohort 5 relative to the immunization of infants in cohort 4 after differencing out the 
trend increase in immunization.  
These baseline estimates are in the range of 0.14 to 0.16 for individual vaccines and for the case 
of full immunization and are all highly statistically significant. The baseline case also estimates a 
statistically significant reduction of 0.16 in the probability of an infant in high focus states not 
receiving any immunization. It was earlier established that high focus states have a much higher 
concentration of hired and trained ASHA workers but do not have a higher degree of 
implementation of other NRHM provisions that could have an effect on immunization. The 
second row of table 5 adds individual level covariates to the model such as the age and gender of 
the infant, mother’s age, her age at marriage, the caste and religion of the household as well as 
the type of house the household lives in. These variables are not expected to be a source of 
omitted variable bias when the treatment varies at an aggregate level but are added to the model 
because they are strong predictors of immunization and absorb some of the variance in the 
dependent variable, yielding more precise estimates. As expected the results are slightly stronger 
both in significance and magnitude with the addition of these covariates. In the third row I add-in 
state-fixed effects as an additional robustness check. 
The last row of table 6 controls for state-time trends. In the absence of specific state-time varying 
covariates in this specification, the state-time trend variable captures omitted variables at the 
state-time level that may be causing the group of high focus states to have a higher growth rate of 
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immunization in comparison to non-focus states. The inclusion of this variable reduces the 
treatment effect of the program for the case of immunization with BCG vaccination and for the 
case of no immunization, accounting for a part of the upward bias in these estimates.  
Nevertheless all results remain statistically significant and suggest that the ASHA worker 
program increased immunization coverage in the range of 12-17% in high focus Indian states. 
In table 6, I present results from estimating the restricted version of the baseline model ( ) using 
cohorts 4 & 5 and sequentially adding covariates to result in the final specification as in 
regression equation( ). The estimates in the first three rows of table 6 are very similar to the 
estimates reported previously in table 5. The difference in the two baseline estimations is that 
table 6 reports a restricted version of the model with only cohorts 4 and 5 and the first row of 
table 5 reports unrestricted estimates using all cohorts and all pairs of cohort-treatment 
interactions with cohort 4 being the base case of comparison. I estimate this restricted version of 
the model in order to be able to control for specific state-time varying covariates for which 
information in the DLHS 1 survey (corresponding to the first two cohorts) was not available.  
The matrix of state-time covariates that I control for are covariates from the village level files of 
the DLHS 2 and DLHS 3 surveys, aggregated up to the state and cohort (time) level. In particular, 
I control for “pre” and “post” state averages of a host of variables related to the public health set-
up that may be varying differentially for high focus Indian states during the time period elapsed 
between the time represented by cohorts 4 and 5, i.e. between 2004 and 2008 and that have an 
effect on immunization. 
When assessing the robustness of the baseline estimates to state-time varying covariates, I find 
that the differential increase in anganwadi centers in high focus states vis-à-vis non-focus states 
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accounted for a correction of up to 4-7% in the treatment effect of the ASHA worker program as 
can be seen for the different cases of immunization in row 3 of table 6. Between 2004 and 2008 
the percentage of villages with an anganwadi center in high focus states increased from 79% to 
90% whereas the corresponding increase in non-focus states was -1%. As was noted earlier, the 
anganwadi center is a highly relevant institution for immunization delivery as the anganwadi 
worker is in close touch with mothers of children under 6 and because monthly immunization 
camps in the village are organization at the anganwadi center. Moreover, prior to the ASHA 
worker, it was the anganwadi worker’s responsibility to maintain immunization records of the 
village. 
In the last row of table 6, in addition to the “percentage of villages with an anganwadi center” 
covariate I control for a host of other factors that could be additional sources of omitted variable 
bias. Upon adding these covariates, I find that the treatment effect of the ASHA worker program 
becomes much stronger as compared to the estimates in row 4 of table 6. Both the point 
estimates and the significance of estimates upon the addition of the full set of covariates is 
comparable and in some instances stronger than the baseline case with no covariates. The 
additional state-averaged covariates that I control for in the final estimation (row 5 table 6) are 
the percentage of villages that have a government dispensary, the percentage of villages that 
have a private clinic, the percentage of villages that have a sub-center, the percentage of villages 
that have a PHC, the percentage of villages that have a CHC, the percentage of villages that have 
government/district hospital and the percentage of villages that have a private hospital. For 
villages that do not have a particular health facility, I also have data for the distance to the 
nearest facility outside of their village. Correspondingly, I control for the average distance of a 
government dispensary from a village, for the average distance of a private clinic from a village, 
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and corresponding variables that measure the average distance of a sub-center, a PHC, a CHC, 
and a private hospital from a village. I also control for the percentage of villages with a mobile 
health clinic visit, the percentage of sub-centers in a state that received and utilized untied 
NRHM funds and the percentage of sub-center areas in a state that formed Village Health and 
Sanitation Committees. 
Therefore, after controlling for the increase in the percentage of villages with an anganwadi 
center, the model is robust to differential changes in a host of other public health sector 
covariates. The final specification suggests that the ASHA worker program increased the 
coverage of childhood immunization by 14%-22% in high focus Indian states and reduced the 
percentage of children with no immunization by roughly 16% in high focus states. 
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5 Robustness Checks 
 
When the regressor of interest varies at a group level, as is the case in a difference-in-differences 
(DID) research design, identification assumptions are threatened by the possibility that the 
outcome of interest could vary systematically across the group of regions. This implies that we 
have reason to suspect that even in the absence of the ASHA worker program increases in 
immunization coverage in high focus states could be systematically different as compared to 
increases in immunization in non-focus states. Moreover, if the increase in immunization is 
correlated with initial levels, this pattern of increase would be observed in the data even if the 
program had no effect ( DUFLO (2001)).  
In other words, for credible estimates of the effect of the ASHA worker program on the coverage 
of basic childhood immunization, it is imperative that immunization trends in high and non-focus 
Indian states prior to 2005 be investigated. In particular, we need to investigate the claim that our 
assumed “trend” increase, as proxied by the increase in mean immunization levels among non-
focus states, is justified. 
Tables 7.1-7.5 present DID estimates for pairs of different cohorts consisting of children who 
were born and interviewed prior to 2005. Each table has six boxes, one for each vaccine and each 
box shows mean immunization levels for each cohort-region pair and the difference in the 
differences estimate as in equation (1) or the   coefficient in equation ( )  . These estimates 
form “placebo” tests and to the extent that they are not positive and significantly different from 
zero, they validate our main results. 
Tables 7.1-7.3 consists of estimates of   in equation ( ) estimated using cohorts 1 & 2, cohorts 2 
& 3 and cohorts 3 & 4. In none of these cases is the estimate of  , that is the DID estimate, 
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significantly different from zero. At first pass, it may be reasonable to assume that the increase in 
immunization for high focus states in the absence of the ASHA worker program can be proxied 
for using the increase in mean immunization among non-focus states for the period under 
consideration. 
However, it may be argued that the estimates in tables 7.1-7.3 are not a good representation of 
the trend increase in immunization between cohorts 4 & 5 because these cohorts extend over a 
much longer time period as opposed to other cohort pairs. In particular infants in cohort 4 consist 
of 12-23 month olds interviewed in 2004 and cohort 5 consists of 12-23 month olds interviewed 
in 2008. The time elapsed between other cohorts  is not more than 2 years. For this reason, in 
tables 7.4-7.5, I investigate the rate of increase in immunization levels between cohorts 1 & 3 
and cohorts 2 & 4. In most cases, estimates of   are not significantly different from zero. The 
trends in DPT 3 and OPV 3 vaccines are significantly different from zero and this poses some 
cause of concern. However, in both cases the DID estimate is significant and negative. To the 
extent to which this biases our results we can expect that our estimates of the effects of the 
ASHA worker program, for the case of these two vaccines, are an underestimate of the true 
effect. 
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6 Discussion of Results 
 
Results in the previous section show large and statistically significant gains in immunization 
coverage between cohorts 4 and 5 in high focus Indian states.  I employ a difference-in-
differences estimation framework to argue that these gains in immunization coverage are 
attributable to India’s ASHA worker program, which was implemented with a much higher 
intensity in high focus Indian states relative to non-focus states. Because these gains in 
immunization coverage are large, it is imperative that we further explore the mechanisms 
through which an ASHA worker may be impacting immunization. This is important, both to 
understand the channels through which community health workers are effective and to provide 
further credibility to the results at hand. 
In Table 8, I compare the percentage of mothers who received advice/consultation by a doctor or 
a health worker in 2004 and 2008 in high and non-focus states. In particular, I look at the 
coverage of outreach services related to immunization, institutional deliveries, family planning 
and awareness of RTI/STIs
9
 and AIDS. With regards to immunization services, large gains in 
outreach coverage are evident in high focus states. The percentage of mothers of infants in cohort 
4 (interviewed in 2004) who were advised by a doctor or health worker to get their child 
immunized was roughly 38 percent and this figure increased to 71 percent for mothers of infants 
in cohort 5 (interviewed in 2008). In contrast, virtually no change was seen in non-focus states. 
There is a close to 4 percent gain in the percentage of women motivated by a doctor/health 
worker to institutionally deliver, in high focus states, between 2004 and 2008 but a decline of 
nearly 11 percent for the same in non-focus states. There is a larger gain in the coverage of 
family planning related outreach in high focus states, when compared to their non-focus 
                                                             
9 Reproductive Tract Infections and Sexually Transmitted Infections are acronymized as RTI/STI. 
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counterparts, between the two years, but a larger gain in the spread of RTI/STI and AIDS 
awareness for the latter group of states. Keeping in view the large gains in immunization, 
institutional deliveries and family planning outreach in high focus states relative to non-focus 
states, it is interesting to note that the payment related tasks of the ASHA worker involve 
payment per immunization session and “pulse polio day” organized, per institutional delivery 
facilitated and for motivating couples towards tubectomies and vasectomies
10
.  
In Table 9, I look at the break down of different sources from which mothers of infants in cohort 
5 were motivated to get their children immunized, in high and non-focus states. The most ideal 
comparison would have been to see the change in the composition of these sources among 
mothers of infants in cohorts 4 and 5 but, unfortunately, this detailed break-down of sources was 
not collected for mothers in previous surveys. While it is not surprising to see that both public 
health networks of information provision as well as the flow of “positive health-related advice” 
among private networks are stronger in the non-focus states, it is informative to notice that in a 
short period and despite not realizing the full scope of its intensity by 2008, the ASHA worker is 
a significant source of information for mothers in high focus states. 10.23 percent of mothers in 
high focus states claimed to have been motivated by an ASHA worker as opposed to 2.13 
percent in non-focus states. However, in terms of the raw increase in the number of mothers who 
claim to have been motivated by a doctor/health worker to get their child immunized in high 
focus states, direct motivation by an ASHA worker accounts for only 30% of the increase
11
.  
                                                             
10 Other payment related tasks are for organizing a Village Health Day, for motivating the adoption of tuberculosis 
treatment, a household toilet promotion fee and to detect and refer leprosy cases. 
11 This figure was obtained by dividing the number of mothers who reportedly were motivated by the ASHA worker 
to get their child/children vaccinated by the increase in the number of mothers who were motivated by a 
doctor/health worker in favor of immunization.  
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Undoubtedly, a good part of the increase can be attributed to the increased number of anganwadi 
centers in high focus states.  As was discussed before, there was a sharp increase in the number 
of anganwadi centers in high-focus states, as compared to non-focus states, over the time period 
under consideration. While, this increase in anganwadi centers was controlled for in previous 
regressions, the extent to which the two effects can be cleanly separated is not immediately clear. 
Moreover, the ASHA worker is envisioned not to work in isolation but as an integral part of the 
public health system, working together with other health personnel to both ease their work-
pressures and assist them in performing their duties more efficiently. For instance, the ASHA 
worker works with the ANM and the anganwadi worker to organize monthly village health days. 
Therefore, the extent to which the increase in information provision via other health workers is 
attributable to the ASHA worker is again not quantifiable in this context. 
To further buttress the idea that the large increase in immunization in high focus states was 
because of an increase in outreach as opposed to a general increase in the quality of other public 
health infrastructure, I look at the breakdown of the reasons cited by mothers for not getting their 
child immunized, among the sample of infants in who received no immunization. These results 
are tabulated in Table 10 for cohorts 4 and 5 in high and non-focus states. While these figures are 
to be treated with some caution owing the difference in the way the reason were elicited from 
respondents in the two survey rounds, some stylized facts can be gleaned. First of all, there is a 
reduction in the percentage of mothers who cite that they were unaware of the need for 
immunization in high focus states but an increase in the percent unaware in non-focus states. 
There is also a steep decline in the percentage of mothers who claim that the place of 
immunization was unknown to them in both high and non-focus states. In contrast, when we look 
at variables more indicative of the physical supply of infrastructure, there was a close to 56 
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percent decline in the percentage of mothers who stated that the place of immunization was too 
far to go to in non-focus states but a one percent increase in the percentage of mothers who cited 
this reason in high focus states. Other factors like the inconvenience in the time of immunization 
provision and the availability of ANMs and vaccines were more or less unchanged in the two 
groups of states. 
While direct motivation by an ASHA worker towards immunization is the most obvious channel 
for outreach, there are undoubtedly indirect ways in which an ASHA worker can exert a positive 
influence on mothers. In Tables 11 and 12, I explore two indirect channels, via motivation for 
institutional deliveries and antenatal care. In Table 11, which pertains to the group of high focus 
states, I compare the predicted probabilities of immunization for infants in cohort 5 whose 
mothers were motivated by an ASHA worker for institutional delivery or to avail of antenatal 
care with those infants whose mothers did not receive motivation by an ASHA worker for the 
same. The predicted probabilities are reported for the sample of infants whose mothers received 
motivation for delivering institutionally/antenatal care only from an ASHA worker and no other 
health worker or family member and whose mothers received no direct motivation from any 
doctor or health worker for immunization. Table 12 reports the same figures but for the group of 
non-focus states. 
While a causal investigation of the aforementioned mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, 
table 11 suggests that the predicted probability for immunization of infants whose mothers were 
motivated for institutional deliveries/antenatal care is higher when compared to the group of 
infants whose mothers were not, in high focus states. While effects are evident for both cases, 
they are stronger for when the mother was motivated for antenatal care. In contrast, eyeballing 
table 12 makes it clear that predicted immunization probabilities are much higher for the group 
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of infants whose mothers were not motivated for antenatal care or institutional deliveries by an 
ASHA worker. The numbers make it clear that for the group of non-focus states, ASHA workers 
were operational only in those areas of the state that performing exceptionally poorly and this is 
line with the policy rule of the program which placed ASHA workers only in areas with majority 
tribal population in non-focus states. 
Table 13 summarizes OLS results that backdrop tables 11 and 12. While nothing definitive can 
be implied, statistically significant differences between the two groups of infants are evident. 
The direction of “causation” is clear for non-focus states, but for the case of high-focus states, 
the question of spill-over effects between different tasks of the ASHA worker remains open and 
encouraging. 
Overall, the broad picture that emerges is one of increased outreach in high focus states relative 
to non-focus states and a reduction in unawareness pertaining to immunization. Apart from 
increased number of ASHA workers and anganwadi centers there does not seem to be any 
perceptible increase in the supply of other public health infrastructure. While direct motivation 
by an ASHA worker for immunization accounts for roughly 30 percent of the increase in 
outreach in high focus states, suggestive evidence for indirect/spillover effects via motivation for 
institutional delivery and antenatal check-ups is presented. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Several developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are in the process of scaling 
up CHW interventions in efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals in the run up to 
2015. India implemented a national CHW program, the ASHA worker program in 2005, with the 
aim of providing one ASHA worker per population of 1,000 in 18 high focus Indian states and in 
tribal areas of non-focus states. Currently, the program is being scaled up further to most states in 
India. 
This paper uses three rounds of data representative at the district level to assess the effect of the 
program on a central task of the public health machinery in India- the provision of universal 
childhood immunization. Much of the evaluation of the program till date has been qualitative in 
nature and this paper attempts to quantify the effect of the program using evaluation techniques 
less common in the public health domain. It is hoped that the marginal effects estimated by the 
study can be used to shed light on the sustainability of the program, in a scenario where previous 
experiments of a similar nature have not borne fruition.  
Between 2005 and 2009 the ASHA worker program was implemented twice as intensively in 
high focus Indian states in comparison to non-focus states. This assignment was not random 
because states that were lagging behind on specific public health indicators, i.e. the high focus 
states, were chosen for the initial implementation of the program. In such a scenario, a 
difference-in-differences framework is employed to study the effect of the ASHA worker 
program, in high focus Indian states, on the provision of different vaccinations, the outcomes on 
full immunization and the reduction in no immunization. This estimation strategy does not 
require treatment and control states to balance on baseline characteristics, but for an identifying 
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assumption of common immunization trends to be satisfied in the two groups of states. This 
identifying assumption is presented in great detail in the paper. 
Additionally, the paper controls for a host of state-time varying covariates relevant to the public 
health set-up and which may have an effect on immunization delivery as these are likely to be 
sources of omitted variable bias. Here, it is found that controlling for the differential increase in 
the number of anganwadi centers in high focus states, an institution highly relevant for 
immunization provision, revises the treatment effect of the ASHA worker program downwards 
by a significant amount but after controlling for this covariate the model is highly robust to a 
host of other state-time varying covariates and state-time trends. 
The model estimates statistically significant increases in the range of 14%-22% in the coverage 
of specific vaccines and the provision of full immunization in high focus states and a reduction in 
the percentage of infants with no immunization of up to 16%. 
An explanation of the results is attempted by exploring other available data on the functioning of 
the ASHA worker. In particular, I look at the change in the coverage of outreach activities by 
health personnel between 2004 & 2008, the major channels through which mothers are motivated 
to get their child immunized and the change in the composition of reasons that mothers cite to 
not get their child immunized. Finally, I present a preliminary take on the indirect effects of the 
ASHA worker on immunization via spill-overs through other tasks. 
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Appendix- Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1- Summary of cohorts of infants aged 12-23 months 
Cohort Interviewed In Born between  Number of Infants 
1 1998 Feb 1996-Dec 1997 31511 
2 1999 Feb 1997-Dec 1998 35192 
3 2002 Feb 2000-Dec 2001 28670 
4 2004 Feb 2002-Dec 2003 30502 
5 2008 Feb 2006-Dec 2007 60775 
Source: DLHS 1, DLHS 2, DLHS 3
36 
 
Table 2- Percentage of 12-23 month olds immunized in high & non focus states 
  
 
                        
             
 
BCG DPT 3 OPV 3 Measles Full None 
 
High Non High Non High Non High Non High Non High Non 
cohort 1 61.49 87.46 50.53 80.82 53.93 81.77 41.59 73.52 35.56 67.59 32.07 8.41 
cohort 2 61.90 87.91 50.42 80.87 52.52 81.83 44.96 77.23 37.23 69.80 32.97 8.20 
cohort 3 61.97 90.34 40.45 79.41 41.76 78.11 38.88 76.01 27.02 65.85 33.14 7.34 
cohort 4 63.16 91.69 40.63 82.21 41.17 82.77 40.33 76.78 29.60 71.00 33.45 6.39 
cohort 5 82.21 94.03 53.54 78.24 55.88 81.72 60.42 82.55 43.35 69.64 15.70 4.63 
  
          
    
Note: Children are fully immunized if they receive 1 dose of BCG vaccine, 3 doses of DPT vaccine, 3 doses of Polio vaccine (excluding 
Polio 0) and 1 dose of measles vaccine as recommended by MoHFW guidelines. 'None' refers to children who do not receive any of the 4 
groups of vaccines. All figures are calculated for the sample of rural infants in the age group. 
   
   Source: DLHS 1, DLHS 2, DLHS 3 
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Table 3- Percentage of Villages with ASHA Worker in each State 
 
    High-Focus States Other States 
State Percentage State Percentage 
Jammu & Kashmir 72.70 Punjab 69.05 
Himachal Pradesh 24.42 Chandigarh 79.66 
Uttarakhand 75.74 Haryana 80.46 
Rajasthan 73.86 Delhi 31.08 
Uttar Pradesh 86.39 West Bengal 13.40 
Bihar 80.30 Gujarat 38.57 
Sikkim 80.77 Daman & Diu 10.91 
Arunachal Pradesh 72.88 Dadra & Nagar Haveli 38.79 
Manipur 71.95 Maharashtra 10.20 
Mizoram 68.39 Andhra Pradesh 69.13 
Tripura 89.06 Karnataka 15.55 
Meghalaya 75.87 Goa 0.00 
Assam 85.76 Lakshadweep 100.00 
Jharkhand 53.93 Kerala 29.04 
Orissa 57.52 Tamil Nadu 1.20 
Chhattisgarh 91.05 Pondicherry 4.77 
Madhya Pradesh 74.06 Andaman & Nicobar 42.59 
    
Source: DLHS 3  
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Table 4- Descriptive Statistics on different NRHM provisions in high & non focus 
states 
 
High 
Focus 
 
Non 
Focus 
 
% of villages with an ASHA worker 
 
74.02 
 
33.04 
 
Average number of ASHA workers who have completed first 
round of training in Sub-Center area 
 
4.60 1.66 
% of Sub-Centers that have received untied funds 
 
76.26 
 
89.14 
 
% of Sub-Centers that have fully utilized untied funds 
 
28.92 
 
50.13 
 
% of Sub-Center areas that have a Village Health & Sanitation 
Committee 
 
63.96 84.64 
% of Primary Health Centers that have received untied funds 
 
65.34 
 
87.20 
 
% of Primary Health Centers that have fully utilized untied funds 
 
24.26 
 
48.02 
 
% of Community Health Centers that have received untied funds 
 
81.82 
 
90.09 
 
% of Community Health Centers that have fully utilized untied 
funds 
 
32.62 
 
 
46.06 
 
 
% of District Hospitals with a Rogi Kalyan Samiti (RKS) 86.61 93.43 
Source: DLHS 3
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Table 5- Regression results from equation (3) estimated using cohorts 1-5 
(DID estimates (δ) of the effect of the ASHA worker program on the probability of 
immunization) 
       
 
BCG DPT3 OPV3 Measles Full  None 
       Baseline 
 
0.167*** 
 
0.169** 
 
0.158** 
 
0.143** 
 
0.151** 
 
-0.160*** 
 
With Individual Level 
Covariates 
 
0.173*** 0.175*** 0.164** 0.151** 0.159** -0.166*** 
With state-fixed effects 
 
0.168*** 0.167** 0.159** 0.145** 0.148** -0.165*** 
With state-time trends 0.122*** 0.153*** 0.169*** 0.130** 0.174** -0.111*** 
Notes:  
 
1) + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
2) The individual level covariates are the infant's age, infant's gender, mother's age, mother's age 
at marriage, total number of children born to the mother, religion and caste of the household and 
type of house (kuccha or pucca).  
 
3) The R-squared of the final set of regressions ranges between 0.17 and 0.20 and the number of 
observations is 144,598. 
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Table 6- Regression results from the model estimated using cohorts 4 & 5 
(DID estimates of the effect of the ASHA worker program on the probability of immunization) 
       
 
BCG DPT3 OPV3 Measles Full  None 
       Baseline 
 
0.167*** 
 
0.169** 
 
0.158** 
 
0.143** 
 
0.151** 
 
-0.160*** 
 
With Individual Level 
Covariates 
 
0.176*** 0.182*** 0.169*** 0.158** 0.165** -0.168*** 
With state-fixed effects 
 
0.174*** 0.172*** 0.162** 0.148** 0.150** -0.169*** 
With "% of villages with an 
anganwadi center" covariate 
 
0.105* 0.145* 0.162* 0.0997 0.127+ -0.0936* 
      With all other state-time 
varying covariates (Including 
the anganwadi center covariate) 
0.169*** 0.187** 0.224*** 0.166*** 0.149*** -0.162***  
            
Notes: 
1) + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
     2) The state-time varying covariates are % of villages (in a state) that have a government dispensary, % of villages that have a 
private clinic, % of villages that have a sub-center, % of villages with a PHC, % of villages with a CHC, % of villages with a 
government hospital, % of village with a private hospital,  average distance of a government dispensary from a village, average 
distance of a private clinic from a village, average distance of a SC from a village, average distance of a PHC from a village, 
average distance of a CHC from a village, average distance of a private hospital from a village, % of villages with an anganwadi 
center, % of villages with a mobile health clinic visit, % of sub-centers who received untied funds as part of NRHM, % of sub-
centers that utilized untied funds and % of sub-center areas that formed a Village Health and Sanitation Committee. 
 
3) The R-squared of the final set of regressions varies between 0.15-0.19. The number of observations is 68,672 and the individual 
level covariates are the same as in Table 5. 
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Robustness Check Tables (7.1-7.5)  
Table 7.1- Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimates for different cohorts born prior to the intervention 
  BCG DPT 3 OPV 3 
 
High  Non Difference High  Non Difference High  Non Difference 
Cohort 1 0.615 0.873 
 
0.505 0.807 
 
0.54 0.817 
 
Cohort 2 0.619 0.878 
 
0.504 0.808 
 
0.526 0.819 
 
Difference 
 
0.004 
 
0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.014 0.002 -0.016 
 
Measles Full None 
 
High  Non Difference High  Non Difference High  Non Difference 
Cohort 1 0.416 0.734 
 
0.355 0.674 
 
0.319 0.084 
 
Cohort 2 0.45 0.771 
 
0.3717 0.6977 
 
0.328 0.081 
 
Difference 0.034 0.037 -0.003 0.0167 0.0237 -0.007 0.009 -0.003 0.012 
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Table 7.2- Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimates for different cohorts born prior to the intervention 
 
 
BCG 
 
DPT 3 
 
OPV 3 
 
 
High  
 
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
Cohort 2 0.619 0.879 
 
0.505 0.809 
 
0.525 0.819 
 
Cohort 3 0.619 0.902 
 
0.406 0.794 
 
0.418 0.781 
 
Difference 0 0.023 -0.023 -0.099 -0.015 -0.084 -0.107 -0.038 -0.069 
 
 
Measles 
 
Full 
 
None 
 
 
High  Non Difference High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
Cohort 2 0.45 0.772 
 
0.372 0.698 
 
0.329 0.081 
 
Cohort 3 0.391 0.761 
 
0.271 0.658 
 
0.331 0.074 
 
Difference -0.059 -0.011 -0.048 -0.101 -0.04 -0.061 0.002 -0.007 0.009          
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Table 7.3- Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimates for different cohorts born prior to the intervention 
  
 
BCG 
 
DPT 3 
 
OPV 3 
 
 
High  Non Difference High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High  
 
Non 
 
Difference 
 
Cohort 3 0.62 0.903 
 
0.405 0.794 
 
0.418 0.781 
 
Cohort 4 0.632 0.916 
 
0.406 0.821 
 
0.4115 0.827 
 
Difference 0.012 0.013 -0.001 0.001 0.027 -0.026 -0.0065 0.046 -0.052 
 
 
Measles 
 
Full 
 
None 
 
 
High  Non Difference High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
Cohort 3 0.389 0.760 
 
0.27 0.658 
 
0.33 0.073 
 
Cohort 4 0.402 0.767 
 
0.296 0.709 
 
0.333 0.064 
 
Difference 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.026 0.051 -0.0257 0.003 -0.009 0.012 
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Table 7.4- Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimates for different cohorts born prior to the intervention 
 
BCG 
 
DPT 3 
 
 
OPV 3 
 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High  
 
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High  
 
Non 
 
Difference 
 
Cohort 1 
 
0.615 0.873  0.505 
 
0.807 
 
 
0.54 
 
0.817 
 
 Cohort 3 
 
0.62 
 
0.902 
 
 
0.405 
 
0.794 
 
 
0.419 
 
0.781 
 
 Difference 
 
0.005 
 
0.029 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.087* 
 
-0.121 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.085* 
 
 
Measles 
 
Full 
 
None 
 
 
High  
 
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High  
 
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
Cohort 1 
 
0.416 0.734  0.355 
 
0.674 
 
 
0.319 
 
0.084 
 
 Cohort 3 
 
0.389 
 
0.759 
 
 
0.271 
 
0.658 
 
 
0.329 
 
0.073 
 
 Difference 
 
-0.027 
 
0.025 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.084 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.068 
 
0.01 
 
-0.011 
 
0.021 
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 Table 7.5- Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimates for different cohorts born prior to the intervention 
 
 
BCG 
 
DPT 3 
 
OPV 3 
 
 
High  
 
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
Cohort 2 
 
0.619 0.879  0.505 
 
0.809 
 
 
0.525 
 
0.819 
 
 Cohort 4 
 
0.632 
 
0.916 
 
 
0.407 
 
0.821 
 
 
0.412 
 
0.827 
 
 Difference 
 
0.013 
 
0.037 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.098 
 
0.012 
 
-0.11** 
 
-0.113 
 
0.008 
 
-0.121** 
 
 
Measles 
 
Full 
 
None 
 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High  
 
Non 
 
Difference 
 
High 
  
Non 
 
Difference 
 
Cohort 2 
0.45 0.772  
0.372 0.698 
 
0.329 0.081 
 
Cohort 4 0.405 0.768 
 
0.296 0.709 
 
0.334 0.064 
 
Difference -0.045 -0.004 -0.041 -0.076 0.011 -0.087* 0.005 -0.017 0.022 
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Table 8: Percentage of mothers who have received  advise/consultation by a doctor or a 
health worker  
 
 
High Focus 
 
Non Focus 
 
 
2004 
 
2008 
 
2004 
 
2008 
 
Immunization 
 
38.11 
 
71.56 
 
78.62 
 
78.90 
 
Institutional Delivery 
 
18.99 
 
23.32 
 
50.83 
 
39.01 
 
Family Planning 
 
7.87 
 
16.63 
 
18.98 
 
24.64 
 
RTI/STI 
 
7.7 
 
16.79 
 
10.33 
 
22.17 
 
AIDS 14.85 18.46 11.98 21.43 
Notes: 
 
    1) For immunization, institutional delivery and family planning, DLHS 3 questioned respondents 
about each source (including family members, NGOs) separately. Responses are re-coded into a 
dummy that takes value 1 if responded was motivated by a doctor, ANM, other health worker, 
anganwadi worker or ASHA worker to avail of a particular service. DLHS 2 simply asks if the 
respondent was motivated by a doctor/health worker. 
 
2) Sample includes respondents interviewed in 2004 and 2008 only, to maintain consistency with 
cohorts 4 and 5 
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Table 9: Sources of motivation to get child immunized in 2008 
 
    
    High Focus 
 
    Non Focus 
 
Doctor 
 
9.93 
 
17.61 
 
ANM 
 
33.2 
 
42.93 
 
Health Worker (other) 
 
6.93 
 
7.84 
 
Anganwadi Worker 
 
32.32 
 
40.54 
 
ASHA 
 
10.32 
 
2.13 
 
NGO/CBO 
 
0.84 
 
0.30 
 
Husband 
 
19.57 
 
26.28 
 
Mother-in-law 
 
9.69 
 
16.35 
 
Mother 
 
5.44 
 
12.37 
 
Relatives/Friends 
 
23.83 
 
21.38 
 
Self 
 
34.74 
 
40.87 
 
Other 1.21 0.82 
Note: This table tabulates the percentage of mothers, of infants in cohort 5, who responded 'yes' 
when asked if each source listed above motivated the respondent to get their child immunized. 
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Table 10: Reasons for not getting child immunized in high & non-focus states 
 
High Focus  Non Focus 
 
Cohort 4 Cohort 5 Cohort 4 Cohort 5 
Child too young for immunization 1.85 5.76 1.39 12.34 
Unaware of need for immunization 40.84 37.2 27.42 31.17 
Place of immunization unknown 10.24 3.75 6.93 1.95 
Time of immunization unknown 5.13 4.30 10.8 3.9 
Fear of side-effects 6.09 9.51 10.8 11.69 
No faith in immunization 2.81 3.66 3.32 4.55 
Place of immunization too far to go 8.16 9.32 7.48 3.25 
Time of immunization inconvenient 1.61 2.56 1.94 1.3 
ANM absent  8.74 8.68 4.43 4.55 
Vaccine not available 1.39 0.91 0.55 0.65 
Mother too busy 4.81 4.2 5.82 9.09 
Family problem, including illness of mother 2.46 0.82 2.22 4.55 
Child ill, not brought 1.07 3.2 2.22 5.84 
Child ill, brought, but not given 0.28 1.19 0.00 0.65 
Long waiting time 0.28 0.09 0.55 0.65 
Financial Problem  - 1.55 - 0.00 
Child is girl - 1.37 - 0.00 
Other 3.74 1.92 14.13 3.9 
Number of Observations 4598 1094 361 154 
Notes: 
 
    1) Each row contains the percentage of mothers of infants in cohorts 4 & 5 who listed the given 
reason as the reason for not getting their child immunized. 
 
2) The tabulations are to be treated with some caution. In DLHS 2 (cohort 4) respondents were 
asked to state a single reason but in DLHS 3 (cohort 5) they stated multiple reasons. For 
comparability in the latter case, I limit the sample to those individuals who only stated a single 
reason. 
 
3) The sample is limited to individuals whose infants received no vaccination. 
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Table 11- Predicted probability of immunization for infants whose mothers were 
motivated for antenatal care and institutional delivery by an ASHA worker in high focus 
states 
 
Institutional Delivery 
 
 
Motivated for Delivery  Not Motivated for Delivery 
BCG 0.712 0.706 
DPT3 0.477 0.411 
OPV3 0.499 0.439 
Measles 0.517 0.472 
Full 0.376 0.314 
None 0.255 0.266 
 
 Antenatal Care (ANC) 
 
 
Motivated for ANC  Not Motivated for ANC 
BCG 0.720 0.672 
DPT3 0.444 0.371 
OPV3 0.480 0.402 
Measles 0.523 0.437 
Full 0.367 0.278 
None 0.258 0.299 
Notes: 
   
1) Predicted probabilities are for immunization of infants whose mothers received motivation 
for institutional delivery/ANC only from an ASHA worker and received no motivation for 
immunization by any doctor/health worker. 
2) Predicted probabilities are obtained from a linear regression model. 
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Table 12- Predicted probability of immunization for infants whose mothers were 
motivated for antenatal care and institutional delivery by ASHA worker in non-focus 
states 
 
Institutional Delivery 
 
 
Motivated for Delivery  Not Motivated for Delivery 
BCG 0.793 0.902 
DPT3 0.464 0.698 
OPV3 0.524 0.750 
Measles 0.568 0.757 
Full 0.359 0.613 
None 0.174 0.076 
  
Antenatal Care (ANC) 
 
 
Motivated for ANC  Not Motivated for ANC 
BCG 0.896 0.905 
DPT3 0.654 0.704 
OPV3 0.720 0.750 
Measles 0.841 0.761 
Full 0.589 0.619 
None 0.071 0.085 
 
Notes: 
 
  1) Predicted probabilities are for immunization of infants whose mothers received motivation 
for institutional delivery/ANC only from an ASHA worker and received no motivation for 
immunization by any doctor/health worker. 
 
2) Predicted probabilities are obtained from a linear regression model. 
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Table 13: OLS results for indirect effects on immunization via mothers who were 
motivated by ASHA for ANC and institutional delivery 
 
Institutional Delivery ANC 
 
 
High Focus Non-Focus High Focus Non-Focus 
 BCG 0.00605 -0.109* 0.0484*** 0.00933 
 DPT3 0.0667*** -0.234*** 0.0735*** -0.0498 
 OPV3 0.0599*** -0.226*** 0.0775*** -0.0305 
 Measles 0.0451**  -0.189* 0.0861*** 0.0802* 
 Full 0.0622*** -0.254*** 0.0898*** -0.0297 
 None -0.0108 0.0984* -0.0408*** -0.0146 
 No. of observations 35,215 12,637 33,935 12,037 
 R-squared 0.065 0.027 0.078 0.031   
Notes: 
1) Reported coefficients are for dummies of whether the infants' mother was motivated by an 
ASHA worker for institutional delivery/ANC. 
 
2) Variables controlled for are receipt of motivation for institutional delivery/ANC by doctor, 
ANM, other health worker, anganwadi worker, ASHA, NGO/CBO, husband, mother-in-law, 
mother, relatives/friends, self and others and whether or not responded was motivated for 
immunization by doctor, ANM, other health worker and anganwadi worker. 
 
3) R-squared is of the final regression with dependent variable "none". 
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Figure 1- Immunization Trends in High & Non Focus Indian States 
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